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Resumo
Tropical forest in Brazil, as in other 
countries, faces threats stemming from 
decision making that favors destructive 
development and gives only token 
consideration to lost environmental 
services and other impacts. History, 
particularly the most relevant period 
covering the recent years of  rapid 
development in Amazonia, is a source of  
useful lessons for changing the decision-
making process to favor outcomes that 
are less destructive and more sustainable. 
Development decisions set processes in 
motion with consequences extending far 
into the future, adding urgency to the task 
of  assimilating these lessons. Decisions 
in the coming decade will determine the 
fate of  Brazil’s Amazon forest, as is also 
the case for other countries that could 
benefit from the lessons of  recent history 
in Brazil.
Abstract
A floresta tropical no Brasil enfrenta 
ameaças decorrentes de uma tomada de 
decisão que favorece o desenvolvimento 
destrutivo e só considera simbolicamente 
os serviços ambientais perdidos e outros 
impactos. A história, particularmente o 
período mais relevante que abrange os 
últimos anos de rápido desenvolvimento 
na Amazônia, é uma fonte de lições úteis 
para mudar o processo de tomada de 
decisão para favorecer resultados que são 
menos destrutivos e mais sustentáveis. 
As decisões sobre desenvolvimento 
deslancham processos com consequências 
que se estendem longe no futuro, 
acrescentando urgência à tarefa de 
assimilar essas lições. As decisões na 
próxima década determinarão o destino da 
floresta amazônica brasileira, assim como 
é o caso para outros países, que poderiam 
se beneficiar com as lições da história 
recente do Brasil.
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1 THE RELEVANCE OF THE PAST
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
Nowhere is this notable statement of  George Santayana (1905) more 
relevant, yet ignored in practice, than in the case of  public policies in Brazilian 
Amazonia.
Many of  the major infrastructure projects that today shape the course of  
events in Amazonia (Figure 1) were started during Brazil’s military dictatorship 
(1964-1985). These include the Transamazon Highway and its associated 
colonization projects (MORAN, 1981; SMITH, 1982; FEARNSIDE, 1986a), the 
BR-364 (Cuiabá-Porto Velho) Highway and its POLONOROESTE Program 
(Fearnside, 1987, 1989a), the BR-163 (Santarém-Cuiabá) Highway (TORRES, 
2005; FEARNSIDE, 2007), the BR-319 (Manaus-Porto Velho) Highway 
(FEARNSIDE; GRAÇA, 2009), and a series of  large dams such as Tucuruí, 
Balbina and Samuel (FEARNSIDE, 1989b, 1999, 2001, 2005a). These projects 
were decided by a handful of  generals in Brasília who had them built immediately 
either through private contractors or, as in the cases of  the BR-163 and BR-
319 Highways, by sending the army itself  to build the infrastructure. Not only 
were no environmental impact studies done, but decisions were made without 
economic viability studies that calculate the costs and benefits purely in terms 
of  monetary flows. Whenever examples of  environmental and social impacts 
of  these projects are brought up in discussions of  current infrastructure plans, 
the usual government response is that Brazil is entirely different today, and that 
past disasters are the fault of  the dictatorship and will never be repeated again 
due to the requirement of  an environmental impact study and report (EIA-
RIMA) and associated public hearings. But how much has really changed for 
establishing public policies in Amazonia since the dictatorship? The currently 
unfolding history of  major projects suggests that not much has changed. Major 
projects that would set in motion chains of  events with enormous environmental 
and human consequences are still decided by a handful of  high officials and are 
announced and treated as “irreversible” before any environmental or economic 
viability study is done. Examples include reconstruction of  the BR-319 Highway 
(a road that has been abandoned since 1988) and damming the Xingu River at 
Belo Monte. This paper reviews recent history in Brazilian Amazonia in an effort 
to extract lessons that could change decision making in favor of  a less destructive 
course over the coming decade. Decisions in the coming decade will be critical 
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in determining the fate of  Amazonian forest in the remainder of  the century, as 
is also the case in other tropical countries that could learn from history in Brazil. 
Figure 1. Brazil’s Legal Amazon region with locations mentioned in the text.
2 GOVERNMENT PLANS
2.1 FEDERAL PLURIANNUAL PLANS
Brazil’s federal government has been operating under a series of  “pluriannual 
plans” such as Brasil em Ação (Brazil in Action) (1996 to 1999), Avança Brasil (Forward 
Brazil) (2000 to 2003) Plano Plurianual, or “PPA” (Pluriannual Plan) (2004 to 2007), 
the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, better known as the “PAC” (Program 
for the Acceleration of  Growth”) (2008 to 2011) and PAC-2 (2012-2015). Note 
that the object of  the current plan is “growth,” not “development,” much less 
“sustainable development.” The term “growth” implies simply an increase in size, 
whereas “development” implies an improvement, whether or not size increases. 
The plans have, indeed, been focused on size rather than quality, each plan being 
essentially a long list of  highways, dams and other infrastructure projects that the 
government regards as of  high priority. In fact, many of  the projects, such as the 
BR-163 (Santarém-Cuiabá) Highway and the Belo Monte Dam, have remained the 
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same through this sequence of  plans, with expensive projects being successively 
postponed due to lack of  funds or for bureaucratic reasons.
2.2 PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVES
2.2.1 Policy plans
Public policy in Amazonia has been influenced by a wide variety of  
initiatives. These include projects financed by multilateral development banks 
such as the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank, including 
the POLONOROESTE and subsequent PLANAFLORO projects in Rondônia, 
the PMACI project in Acre and the PRODEAGRO project in Mato Grosso 
(see FEARNSIDE, 1987). These attempted to influence policies in various ways, 
including ecological-economic zoning (ZEE). These multilateral development 
bank projects began in the 1980s, and the 1990-2009 period saw a reduction 
in the direct role of  Bank projects for public policies. However, the World 
Bank, together with the Brazilian government—especially the Ministry of  the 
Environment, was co-administrator of  the PPG7 Pilot Program to Conserve 
the Brazilian Rainforest (1992-2008). The PPG7 sponsored a wide variety of  
initiatives throughout Brazilian Amazonia, and a smaller number in the Atlantic 
Forest region (see http://www.mma.gov.br/ppg7/). Projects included the 
“Type-A Demonstration Projects” (PDA) for financing small-scale sustainable 
development projects run by grassroots non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), support for extractive reserves (RESEX) – an activity that started 
before the PPG7 and continues after it, environmental management support 
for selected areas in Amazonian states, forestry management, várzea (floodplain) 
management, ecological-economic zoning by state-level agencies, demarcation of  
indigenous land, fire prevention and control, support for science and technology 
related to Amazonia, and protected area planning and creation in “ecological 
corridors.” These projects had varying degrees of  success, the most notable 
contributions to the environment being demarcating indigenous lands and 
stimulating the formation of  grassroots NGOs in order to qualify for funding 
PDA demonstration projects.
2.2.2 Payment for environmental services
One form of  intervention with considerable potential is payment for 
environmental services (PES). Unfortunately, the main initiative in this area to 
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date, the PROAMBIENTE Program under the Ministry of  the Environment 
(MMA), has had little influence because the payments depend on the MMA’s 
budget. This budget is always inadequate and uncertain, leading the project to 
lose credibility with participating farmers when the payments are not made as 
promised.
Another initiative under the MMA is the Protected Areas in Amazonia 
(ARPA) program (e.g., SOARES-FILHO et al., 2009, 2010). This program works 
to achieve Brazil’s announced goal of  protecting 10% of  each ecosystem in the 
country. Reserve creation in Amazonia is central because opportunities to create 
new reserves are rapidly disappearing as the advancing frontier makes reserve 
establishment politically impractical, especially for the large areas needed to 
maintain Amazonian biodiversity and climate (e.g., PERES, 2005).
2.2.3 Forestry management 
Forestry management is an area where public policies potentially affect 
large areas of  standing forest. In 2006, the Ministry of  the Environment 
proposed and obtained passage of  a law creating “public forests” in Amazonia 
that would be offered for bidding by companies for forestry management. A new 
agency, the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB), was created in the Ministry of  the 
Environment to supervise these and other projects for forest management. The 
main rationale for creating the public forests was that it would quickly establish 
an official presence in areas of  federal government land where use is undefined, 
these being the areas under greatest threat of  invasion by landgrabbers (grileiros). 
Forestry management in private properties requires approval of  forest 
management plans by state-level environmental agencies. This can represent a 
major barrier in practice. For example, in the state of  Amazonas in 2008 there 
were 2000 management plans proposed, of  which only nine were approved. 
Most of  the denied requests were based on lack of  valid land title documents. By 
contrast, forest management in Acre is much more active. It should be noted that 
inherent contradictions in forestry management often make this practice illusory 
as a conservation measure (FEARNSIDE, 1989c, 2003a).
2.2.4 Hydroelectric dams
In practice, much of  the environmental policy in Amazonia is not made 
by the Ministry of  the Environment but by the ministries that build major public 
works such as highways and dams. The Ministry of  Mines and Energy, which 
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is responsible for hydroelectric dams, is therefore a major actor. Its subsidiary, 
ELETROBRÁS, is one of  the few government agencies that engages in long-range 
planning. Unfortunately, this planning is almost entirely devoted to maximizing 
generating capacity to accompany an expected exponential increase in demand, 
which is often erroneously portrayed as “need” for electricity. Virtually never is 
there any questioning of  what the electricity is to be used for. The exponential 
projections of  demand incorporate all of  the inefficiency and waste in current 
energy use and also implicitly ratify plans for an expansion of  electro-intensive 
export industries, especially primary aluminum (e.g., BERMANN, 2012).
After the energy shortage (apagão) of  2001, then-president Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso created the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE). This 
council might have undertaken the sort of  rethinking that is so sorely needed for 
Brazil’s energy sector, and could have taken the lead in weaning the country from 
the unending expansion of  generating capacity to supply the world with cheap 
aluminum. If  Brazil continues down the path of  trying to supply international 
markets with whatever volume of  electro-intensive commodities that the world 
wants to buy, then there is no limit to the number of  hydroelectric dams and 
other forms of  generation that the country “needs.” Unfortunately, the CNPE is 
almost a “ghost” agency, having rarely met since its creation. 
The only time that the electrical sector has ever revealed the full extent of  
dam-building plans in Amazonia was in December 1987 when ELETROBRÁS 
released its 2010 Plan (BRAZIL, ELETROBRÁS, 1987). The total, irrespective 
of  the expected date of  completion, was 79 dams with a combined area of  10 
million hectares, or 2% of  the Brazilian Legal Amazon (see FEARNSIDE, 1995). 
Following intense criticism of  the plan, subsequent public releases of  information 
have been restricted to dams planned for limited periods, such as the 2015 and 
2030 plans and the ten-year “decennial” plans. The 2012-2021 decennial plan 
(BRAZIL, MME, 2012) contains no discussion of  what to do with the electricity 
generated, and furthers the impression that what is at stake are the light bulbs in 
people’s houses rather than increasing export of  products like aluminum. 
2.2.5 Oil and gas 
Petrobrás is also an actor that creates structural changes through its 
infrastructure projects. The logic for several of  the current plans is unclear. A 
gas pipeline from Coarí to Manaus was completed in 2009 and a smaller one 
from Silves to Manaus is nearing completion. The Coarí gas pipeline connects 
with the already completed Urucu-Coarí “polyduct,” which transports both oil 
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and gas. The gas deposit at Urucu is believed to be sufficient to supply Manaus 
for approximately 40 years. It is therefore not clear why Petrobrás has placed a 
priority on a gas pipeline to link Urucu with the much larger gas field at Juruá, 
further to the west. If  the gas is really for Manaus, it would make much more 
sense to wait a few decades until the Urucu gas is nearing an end before investing 
in the second pipeline. The Juruá-Urucu pipeline raises the suspicion that the 
gas is really destined for transport via another much more controversial pipeline 
planned from Urucu to Porto Velho. This pipeline is ostensibly to supply gas 
for a thermoelectric plant in Porto Velho. However, the lack of  logic for this 
pipeline is apparent, given that two large hydroelectric dams on the Madeira River 
are under construction; one (Santo Antônio) began generation in December 
2011 and the other (Jirau) is scheduled for June 2013. These dams will make 
Rondônia a major exporter of  electricity to Brazil’s southeast region. The Urucu-
PortoVelho pipeline would have much greater potential environmental impact 
than the other pipelines because Rondônia is overflowing with people looking 
for land and is the principal source of  migrants to deforestation hotspots in the 
neighboring states of  Amazonas and Acre and the north-western portion of  
Mato Grosso. A pipeline from Porto Velho would open a route for invasion of  
the large block of  intact forest in western Amazonas.
2.2.6 Deforestation control
Deforestation control efforts have included an annual repression campaign 
by the Ministry of  the Environment’s Brazilian Institute for Environment and 
Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). For policy formulation, a potentially 
important event was the creation in 2003 of  the Permanent Interministerial 
Working Group on Deforestation (GT-Desmatamento). However, the measures 
announced in the plan drafted by this interministerial working group (BRAZIL, 
GT-DESMATAMENTO, 2004) have largely remained on paper, with little 
concrete action resulting from them (GREENPEACE, 2005). Nevertheless, 
deforestation rates declined dramatically from 2004 through 2012. Part of  this 
can be attributed to government control efforts (BARRETO et al., 2011) and to 
a complex interaction of  different government and civil-society actors (HECHT, 
2012). About half  of  it is a reflection of  economic trends such as the crash in 
soybean prices from 2003 to 2007 and the decline in international beef  prices over 
the same period, followed by the world-wide fall in demand for commodities in 
2008 with the onset of  economic recession in in much of  the world (ASSUNÇÃO 
et al., 2012). At the same time the exchange rate of  the Brazilian real against 
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other currencies worsened dramatically from the point of  view of  exporters 
of  soybeans or beef: the US$ was worth almost R$4 in 2002, falling to R$1.5 
in 2011 and rising to around R$2 in 2013. For the first portion of  the decline 
in deforestation, from 2004 to 2008, the deforestation rates track international 
commodity prices, but after 2008 deforestation continued to decline despite a 
recuperation of  prices (HARGRAVE; KIS-KATOS, 2011; ASSUNÇÃO et al., 
2012). The decline in deforestation rates has produced a climate of  confidence 
(one might say hubris) among planners in Brasília, who believe that highways 
and dams can be built throughout Amazonia without provoking deforestation. 
Unfortunately, they are likely to be proved wrong when economic forces realign 
to drive clearing rates up (FEARNSIDE, 2010a).
There has been a trend towards transferring increasing amounts of  
authority from the federal government to the state governments in environmental 
matters. Much of  the licensing responsibility has passed to the state environmental 
agencies, IBAMA retaining responsibility for projects that affect more than 
one state. Other state-level initiatives include the “Zona Franca Verde” (“Green 
Free-Trade Zone) program in Amazonas, which includes the creation of  state 
“sustainable development reserves” (RDS). In Acre the “Governo da Floresta” 
(“Government of  the Forest”) has stressed extractive reserves and forestry 
management. In Mato Grosso, the state’s environmental licensing program over 
the 1999-2001 period had a discernible effect on deforestation rates (Fearnside, 
2003b), but various problems have caused it to have counterproductive effects 
because of  “institutional subversion” (RAJÃO et al., 2012). Nevertheless, Mato 
Grosso has had the greatest reduction in deforestation rate among Amazonian 
states over the 2004-2012 period (BRAZIL, INPE, 2013). There is an inherent 
risk in the trend to decentralization, as lower levels of  government such as states 
and municipalities are more easily influenced by the economic power of  those who 
would rather not be fettered by environmental regulations. The nine Amazonian 
states are also quite varied in their attention to the environment: the World 
Bank informally classifies them into three groups -- three “green” states (Acre, 
Amazonas and Amapá), three “red” states (Roraima, Rondônia and Maranhão), 
and three intermediate “yellow” states (Mato Grosso, Tocantins and Pará). 
Threats to the forest came to a head in discussions over revising (or 
essentially abandoning) Brazils “Forest Code,” the 1965 law that requires that a 
percentage of  each private property be maintained in forest as a “legal reserve,” 
in addition to protecting riparian areas and steep slopes (the area of  permanent 
protection, or APP). Although it was possible to avoid most of  the requirements 
under the legislation in force before the 2012 reform of  the Forest Code (LIMA; 
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CAPOBIANCO, 2009). The requirements nevertheless had an important role 
in allowing the government’s executive branch to repress deforestation when 
motivated to do so.
On 24 May 2011 the Chamber of  Deputies (lower house) of  Brazil’s 
National Congress approved a revision of  the Forestry Code (REBELO, 2010). 
The proposal would reduce both the legal reserve and the area of  permanent 
protection, as well as forgive past violations of  the code (e.g., METZGER et 
al., 2010). These changes would have grave consequences for the environment, 
including fostering the general expectation of  impunity for future environmental 
violations (FEARNSIDE, 2010b; VIEIRA; BECKER, 2010). The vote, which 
approved the changes by a margin of  seven to one, represented a defeat for 
the environment with implications far beyond the regulations in question. 
Brazil’s population is now 85%, urban, meaning that the vast majority has no 
direct financial interest in being allowed to deforest more. On the contrary, the 
protection from flooding offered by riparian vegetation and the avoidance of  
landslides provoked by clearing steep hills are roles of  the Forest Code that are 
clearly in the interest of  all except rural landholders. Given the destruction and 
death that was caused by rivers flooding in north-eastern Brazil and by landslides 
on steep hillsides in the state of  Rio de Janeiro during the very period when the 
congressional debate was underway, a seven–to-one vote against the interests of  
most of  the population is hard to explain by normal political logic. During the 
course of  the debate five rural leaders were assassinated, including a well-known 
husband-and-wife team of  environmentalists living near Marabá, Pará. When one 
of  the representatives of  Pará tried to speak of  the murders in the plenary, he 
was booed and prevented from speaking by the other deputies. In other words, 
the anti-environmental wave has reached proportions far beyond the substantial 
numerical power of  the “ruralist block” (representatives of  large landholders). 
On 6 December 2011 the Senate approved the gutted Forestry Code by a vote 
of  59 to 7 after some modest modifications. The modified bill then returned to 
the Chamber of  Deputies, where the completely outnumbered environmentalist 
block decided to “throw in the towel” and boycott the vote on ratifying the 
changes. After a partial presidential veto the bill returned to the Chamber of  
Deputies, where amendments were added to weaken environmental protections 
even further. The Senate approved the final version in May 2012, and, after a 
presidential veto of  selected paragraphs, the law entered into effect together with 
a set of  “provisional measures” from the executive branch (BRAZIL, PR, 2012).
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2.5.7 Climate Negotiations
State government positions on climate negotiations have been a positive 
force since 2008. Similar to the situation in the United States, where the state 
of  California has been significantly more proactive on climate issues than the 
federal government, the Amazonian states have been much more active than the 
federal government in working to obtain international payments for maintaining 
Amazonian forest.
In 2008 the federal government created the Amazon Fund (Fundo 
Amazônia) to receive funds from other countries that want to help Brazil slow 
deforestation. The fund is administered by Brazil’s National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development (BNDES). BNDES is the primary voice in deciding how 
the money will be used, despite the fund having an advisory board that includes 
scientists and NGOs. Norway has promised US$1 billion, and contributed 
approximately one-fourth of  this so far. Germany has promised a much more 
modest amount of  US$28 million, of  which US$4 million was contributed by 
2012. The donations do not generate any form of  carbon credit that can be 
used to offset emissions in the countries that contribute to the fund. Brazil has 
been promoting the fund as the mechanism by which it would like to receive any 
funds intended to slow Amazonian deforestation as a means of  reducing global 
warming. This author believes it unwise to expect this model to serve as the basis 
for financing Amazonian forest maintenance in the future because there will not 
be funds available for voluntary contributions outside of  the crediting system of  
the Climate Convention once countries make serious commitments to reducing 
their national emissions (FEARNSIDE, 2009, 2012a,b).
3 HISTORY DOESN’T FOLLOW THE PLAN
One of  the most obvious lessons of  the history of  public policy in 
Amazonia is that events on the ground often do not transpire the way they are 
planned. The classic examples are the BR-364 (Cuiabá-Porto Velho) Highway 
and the Carajás Iron Project, both of  which the World Bank, which funded the 
projects, believed would be “model” projects for environmental sustainability 
(GOODLAND, 1985). In fact, both created major impacts (FEARNSIDE, 
1986b, 1987, 1989a,d; ANDERSON, 1990). In the case of  the BR-364, public 
concern in the United States over these impacts led directly to creation of  an 
environment department within the World Bank in 1987. There is a strong 
parallel between the history of  these projects and official discourse concerning 
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the proposed reconstruction of  the BR-319 (Manaus-Porto Velho) Highway 
(BRAZIL, SCS-PR, 2009).
Part of  the reason for the discrepancy between plans and real 
developments is the large role of  actors who have little reason to follow the 
plan, or who often have strong reasons for not following the plan. These include 
grileiros (large illegal landgrabbers who obtain title to public land by fraudulent 
means), organized landless peasant movements (sem terras), drug traffickers 
and money launderers, individual squatters (posseiros), and the “ruralist block” 
of  large ranchers and agribusiness interests (e.g, FEARNSIDE, 2008). This 
is especially critical for lawless areas like the Terra do Meio, an area the size 
of  Switzerland that has basically been outside of  the control of  the Brazilian 
government (GREENPEACE, 2001, 2003; FEARNSIDE, 2005b). The Terra 
do Meio has been controlled by drug traffickers, grileiros and other illegal actors 
(SCHÖNENBERG, 2002; TARAVELLA, 2008).
An example of  the gulf  between plans and practice is provided by the 
Sustainable BR-163 Program. This program involves 32 NGOs plus the Brazilian 
government in an effort to turn the BR-163 Highway into a “corridor of  sustainable 
development.” The program proposes a variety of  actions to favor agroforestry 
and other activities by small farmers in an area that has seen rapid advance of  
land grabbing and forest loss for low-grade cattle pastures (ALENCAR et al., 
2005; IPAM, 2005). However, MODIS satellite imagery interpreted by INPE’s 
DETER program indicates this area as one of  the main hotspots of  deforestation 
since 2009, suggesting that deforestation activity is shifting out of  the traditional 
Arc of  Deforestation and into this supposed sustainable development area (e.g., 
BRAZIL, INPE, 2009: 7). In addition, deforestation has entered the Jamanxim 
National Forest on the BR-163, and in January 2012 an executive “provisional 
measure” decreed reduction of  this national forest by 91.308 ha (ISA, 2012).
The case of  the BR-163 Highway illustrates the danger of  governance 
being viewed as something that can simply be taken off  the shelf, and that can 
justify any kind of  infrastructure (FEARNSIDE, 2007). One can’t simply chose 
a “governance” scenario and expect to have history follow this more desirable 
course as compared to a “business-as-usual” scenario: see exchange between 
Nepstad et al. (2002a,b) and Laurance and Fearnside (2002). Simulations of  the 
BR-163 Highway’s impact indicate much less deforestation in a hypothetical 
governance scenario than in a business-as-usual scenario that is based on past 
trends (SOARES-FILHO et al., 2004). In the case of  the BR-163 Highway, what 
has taken place in fact is a more rapid spread of  deforestation than what was 
expected in the business-as-usual scenarios, despite supposedly being an area of  
sustainable development. 
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The current example is the EIA for the BR-319 Highway, where one of  the 
most unlikely scenarios imaginable is presented as the basis for the report endorsing 
the highway. This is one of  “strong environmental governance,” for which the 
example given is Yellowstone National Park, where the park includes roads and 
no one deforests (UFAM, 2009: Vol. 1, p. 185; see FEARNSIDE; GRAÇA, 2009).
Recently the possibility of  cattle being displaced to Amazonia as a result 
of  biofuel expansion in other parts of  Brazil is based on the simple assumption 
that the government will be able to implant a level of  governance in Amazonia 
that curtails any expansion of  deforestation (MELILLO et al., 2009). This 
assumption is critical to a calculated benefit for climate from biofuels. History 
would suggest the imprudence of  assuming such governance would be effective 
when pressures increase. This would have major implications for future monetary 
flows and land-use changes, which could produce substantial emissions through 
displacement of  cattle to Amazonia (e.g., FARGIONE et al., 2008; GIBBS et 
al., 2008). Soy expansion in Mato Grosso has now been statistically linked to 
displacement of  cattle to forest areas in the state of  Pará (ARIMA et al., 2011).
4 WHAT IS THE ‘REAL’ PLAN?: THE ROLE OF DECEPTION
The question of what the ‘real’ plan is relates to one of  the recurrent tricks-
of-the-trade for infrastructure promotion: “deny, then do.” Well-documented 
cases include the filling of  the Balbina reservoir and a sequence of  false promises 
in the case of  the Tucuruí-II hydroelectric project (see FEARNSIDE, 2006). 
Current attention in this regard is focused on what is known by Belo Monte 
Dam opponents as the “institutionalized lie” regarding planned dams on the 
Xingu River upstream of  Belo Monte, namely the official scenario since 2008 
that there will be only one dam built on the Xingu River (NADER, 2008). The 
question of  side roads associated with the BR-319 Highway (BRAZIL, DNIT, 
2002) also appears to fit this pattern. Another case is the Chacorão Dam on the 
Tapajós River, which would flood 18,700 ha of  the Munduruku Indigenous Land 
(MILLIKAN, 2011). This dam would be needed to complete the high-priority 
Tapajós waterway (BRAZIL, PR, 2011a), but it is conspicuously missing from 
announced hydroelectric plans (BRAZIL, PR, 2011b; BRAZIL, MME, 2012).
Unfortunately, the EIA/RIMA is still viewed as a token exercise for 
bureaucratic approval of  the projects, rather than as an input to decision-making. 
It is a bureaucratic hurdle that infrastructure promoters consider to be an 
obstacle and opponents view as an opportunity to delay projects on procedural 
grounds. Unfortunately, the EIA/RIMA does not play its desired role as a 
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serious discussion of  the pros and cons of  each project and of  the development 
strategies of  which the project is a part. While Brazil’s licensing system needs 
to be reformed to take on this role as an input to decision making, the current 
political climate would be likely to turn any effort to enact legislation for this 
purpose into an opportunity to gut the system even further. The May 2011 
vote in the house of  deputies by a margin of  7 to 1 to demolish many of  the 
environmental protections in the Forest Code shows the tenuous nature of  the 
country’s environmental protection.
Despite the severe limitations, the legislative climate in Brazil imposes, the 
lessons of  the history of  environmental decision making in recent decades indicate 
many pitfalls and a few advances that provide useful lessons for continued efforts 
to improve, or at least maintain, environmental policy. Many of  the problems and 
lessons in Brazilian Amazonia are relevant to other parts of  the world.
CONCLUSIONS
We have learned surprisingly little from history in terms of  environmental 
policy in Amazonia despite advances in institution building and great strides in the 
organization and capacity of  civil society. Environmental threats are increasing 
faster than the strengthening of  environmental policies and institutions.
Destructive projects advance through such mechanisms as government 
pluriannual plans, weak environmental institutions as compared to those 
promoting infrastructure, regulatory weakening through agri-business interests 
in the legislature and through decentralization of  licensing and enforcement to 
levels of  government that are more responsive to local entrepreneurial interests 
than to environmental concerns, use of  unrealistic “governance scenarios” 
to justify projects and sometimes outright deception as to the real plans of  
development authorities. Progress continues in key areas such as environmental 
services and, to some extent, international negotiations. However, the current 
anti-environmental political climate in the Brazilian legislature severely restricts 
many avenues for improving environmental policy in Brazilian Amazonia. Many 
of  these problems also apply to other tropical countries.
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